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Playing the Wrong Game: Bounding Externalities in Diverse
Populations of Agents
RESHEF MEIR, Technion—Israel Institute of Technology
DAVID PARKES, Harvard University
e robustness of multiagent systems can be affected by mistakes or behavioral biases (e.g., risk-aversion,
altruism, toll-sensitivity), with some agents playing the “wrong game.” is can change the set of equilibria,
and may in turn harm or improve the social welfare of agents in the system. We are interested in bounding
what we call the biased price of anarchy (BPoA) in populations with diverse agent behaviors, which is the
ratio between welfare in the “wrong” equilibrium and optimal welfare. We study nonatomic routing games,
and derive an externality bound that depends on a key topological parameter of the underlying network. We
then prove two general BPoA bounds for games with diverse populations: one that relies on the network
structure and the average bias of all agents in the population, and one that is independent of the structure but
depends on the maximal bias. Both types of bounds can be combined with known results to derive concrete
BPoA bounds for a variety of specific behaviors (e.g., varied levels of risk-aversion).
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1 INTRODUCTION
Game theory is founded on the assumption that agents are rational decision makers, i.e. maximiz-
ing their utility, and that groups of agents reach an equilibrium outcome. In many games there is
some objective measure of welfare that can be accurately measured in terms of money, time, and
so on. Utility on the other hand, is subjective. It is not always easy to identify an explicit utility
function that an agent is trying to maximize, if such exists. Even when there are objective factors
that affect agents’ utility, such as profit, effort, uncertainty, and temporal delays, various agents
mayweigh these factors differently or have subjective constraints and biases. us different agents
may demonstrate different behavior even in the same situation.
As a concrete example, commuters may have some information on the expected congestion at
each route via traffic reports or a cellphone app. However they also know that this information is
inaccurate, and a risk-averse driver might take into account not just the expected congestion, but
also the likelihood of an unexpected delay, a heuristic safety margin and so on. Moreover, different
commuters may have different levels of risk-aversion, or act upon different heuristics.
e implications of these subjective differences and biases on a multiagent system are two-fold.
First, from the perspective of an outside observer who cares about a particular objective (say, total
latency), the agents are playing the “wrong game.” is is true whether they are failing to optimize
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their true cost due to cognitive limitations and biases [17], or optimizing their true subjective costs
that differ from those of the “objective” observer.
A second related issue, is that the behavior of one agent may exert significant negative exter-
nality on the utility of another. e extreme case is when some agents are adversarial, and act in
a way that tries to minimize the utility of some other agents.
It is well known that even in games without biases or subjective utilities, there may be neg-
ative externalities, and that equilibrium outcomes may be suboptimal in terms of the utilitarian
social welfare. is inefficiency is oen quantified as the Price of Anarchy (PoA), which is the
ratio between the social welfare at the worst equilibrium and the optimal social welfare. Biases
may change the equilibria of the game, and thus have a large effect on the PoA. Externalities are
widely studied in multiagent systems, but usually in the context of well-defined behavior such as
maximizing utility in a game [30, 36] or finding an optimal or stable solution [6, 10, 11]. How can
we hope to bound externalities in a diverse society of agents with assorted biases and behaviors?
e answer will lie in a proper abstraction of such behaviors, but before that we will present our
questions more formally.
Research goals. Suppose that in gameG, each agent i has some true cost function ci (in this paper
we consider negative utilities, i.e. costs). Now, each agent i sees her cost as some other function cˆi ,
and thus we are interested in the equilibria of the biased game Gˆ comprised of modified utilities
or costs {cˆi }i=1,2, ... . We ask the following:
• Is there a bound to the negative externality that type j exerts on type i , that applies regardless of
the type cˆ j? (Example: can we bound the equilibrium latency of type i commuters without any
assumption on the risk-aversion level of others?)
• Is there a bound to the social cost (in the “objective game”G) of Gˆ’s worst equilibrium? (Example:
can we bound the total latency in equilibrium, given all commuters’ subjective cost functions?)
We refer to the ratio between the laer measure and the optimal social cost inG as the Biased Price
of Anarchy (BPoA), and note that it coincides with the PoA when Gˆ = G.
While the first question is straight-forward, the second question may raise some conceptual
debate. One may argue that since agents are acting so as to minimize their biased cost cˆi rather
than ci , this is the cost we should take into account when computing the social cost or welfare.
We justify using G as the baseline for welfare as follows. First, the social cost may be the objective
used by the system designer or analyst, as in our example above. A different analyst might care
about a different goal, resulting in a different objective game G. Second, the social cost may be
the sum of the agents’ true utilities, while the agents are bounded-rational. For example they
may be unaware of some roads [2] or the exact latency functions [43]; they may have uncertainty
regarding actual congestion [44] or the overall amount of other agents [4]; and may assign wrong
probabilities to rare outcomes [24].
Smoothness in routing games. Nonatomic routing games in the Wardrop model [45] are a good
testbed for the questions above: they have very convenient theoretical properties, such as the
uniqueness of equilibrium (up to identical utilities); equilibrium inefficiency and in particular the
PoA is very well understood; and several biases have already been suggested and studied in the
context of routing games (see RelatedWork). e smoothness method allows to leverage a property
of the edge cost functions to obtain a tight upper bound on the Price of Anarchy that is independent
of the network topology: if all cost functions are (λ, µ)-smooth for some parameters λ, µ , then the
PoA is bounded by λ1−µ [16, 38, 39]. us the smoothness of cost functions lets us abstract away
the details of the game and prove PoA bounds on large classes of games.
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1.1 Paper structure and contribution
Aer a short overview of nonatomic routing games, price of anarchy, and a measure of graph
complexity called serial-parallel width (Section 2), we prove a tight bound on the negative exter-
nality in any routing game without any assumption on agents’ behavior (Section 3). Our bound
generalizes previous results from specific behaviors on series-parallel networks [2, 35] to arbitrary
behaviors and networks (parametrized by their serial-parallel width).
Next, we adopt smoothness as an abstraction for general biases and behaviors. In Section 4
we extend the definition of a smooth cost function to (λˆ, µˆ)-biased-smoothness that takes into
account both the “true” and the “biased” cost functions. is approach follows similar extensions
for specific, modified costs [9, 12], and we review recent smoothness bounds for such specific
seings.
In Section 5, we consider games where agents have diverse biases, and use our results from
Section 3 along with biased-smoothness to derive several bounds on the Biased Price of Anarchy.
For example, for symmetric games over series-parallel networks (which have parallel-width of 1),
we derive a BPoA bound in terms of the “average” biased-smoothness: BPoA ≤ O(1)∑i rir λˆi1−µˆ i ,
where ri
r
is the fraction of type i agents in the population. For arbitrary networks, we get a bi-
criteria result that depends both on the average bias as above, and on the serial-parallel width of
the underlying network.
For the special case of polynomial cost functions, we leverage (Section 6) known results on the
PoA in heterogeneous unbiased games to derive a structure-independent BPoA bound. In contrast
to our main results, this bound depends on the worst bias rather than on the average bias.
Appendices A and B contain proofs for Sections 5 and 6, respectively. Appendix C contains a
detailed smoothness analysis of various cost functions. Appendix D presents some bounds on the
price of anarchy in (unbiased) player-specific games that can be derived from our results.
1.2 Related Work
e most-well studied, modified cost function comes about as a result of tolls, where the travel
time plus the imposed toll can be thought of as a modified cost function. In this context, most
papers focus on the objective of minimizing total latency [14, 19, 28], and on the design of op-
timal or practical toll schemes [9, 20, 26, 42]. Heterogeneous biases arise when different agents
have different sensitivity to imposed tolls. We explain in the relevant sections how these papers
technically relate to our work.
Chen et al. [12, 13] apply smoothness analysis to provide BPoA bounds for various games (in-
cluding atomic congestion games) where agents are altruistic, i.e., part of their utility is derived
from the social welfare. In the context of nonatomic routing games, their model is formally equiv-
alent to toll-sensitivity (see Section 4.2).
Acemoglu et al. [2] study nonatomic congestion games where some agents are unaware of the
existence of certain edges, which is equivalent to having awrong cost function that assigns infinite
costs to some edges. ey prove that on directed series-parallel networks, such ignorance can only
lead to a worse equilibrium than under true information, yet the worst-case PoA remains the same.
Another behavioral bias that has been studied in congestion games is risk aversion [3, 4, 32, 35,
37], which can oen be wrien as biased cost functions (see Section 4.2 for details).
Finally, Babaioff et al. [5] consider congestion games where some of the agents are malicious.
Babaioff et al. focused on the effect of a negligible amount of malicious agents, and showed exam-
ples where it can be either detrimental or (surprisingly) beneficial to the other agents, but without
any upper bounds. Indeed, malicious behavior can be considered as another form of bias.
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2 PRELIMINARIES
A network is a 2-terminal directed multigraph G = 〈V , E, s, t〉, where s, t ∈ V are special vertices
(source and target), and every edge e ∈ E belongs to some simple s − t path.
a
s1
t1
b
c
s2
t2
d
A network is series-parallel [18, 25] if it is either a single edge, or composed recur-
sively by joining two series-parallel networks in series or in parallel. E.g., merging
{s1, s2} and {t1, t2} in the following networks also results in a series-parallel network:
2.1 Nonatomic routing games
Following the definitions of Roughgarden [38] and Roughgarden and Tardos [40], a
nonatomic routing game (NRG) is a tuple G = 〈G,m,c, s, t , r〉, where
• G = 〈V , E〉 is a directed multigraph;
• m ∈ N is the number of agent types;
• c = (ce )e ∈E , where ce (x) ≥ 0 is the cost incurred when x agents use edge e;1
• s, t ∈ Vm , where (si , ti ) are the source and target nodes of type i agents;
• r = (ri )i≤m , where ri > 0 is the total mass of type i agents. e total mass of
agents of all types is
∑
i≤m ri = r , and we assume unless specified otherwise
that r = 1.
We denote by Ai ⊆ 2E the set of all directed simple paths between the pair of nodes (si , ti ) in
the graph. us Ai is the set of actions available to agents of type i . We denote by A = ∪iAi the
set of all directed source-target simple paths. We assume that all cost functions mentioned in the
paper (including biased costs mentioned later on) are non-decreasing, continuous, differentiable
and semi-convex (i.e., xce (x) is convex). Such cost functions are called standard [38].
Player-specific costs. A nonatomic routing game with player-specific costs (PNRG) is a tuple G =〈
G,m, (ci )i≤m, s, t, r
〉
. e difference from a NRG is that agents of each type i experience a cost
of cie (x) when x agents use edge e . We can have multiple types with the same source and target
nodes to allow diversity of behavior. To avoid confusion, we refer to (si , ti ) (or Ai ) as the demand
type and to ci as the cost type. us the type i specifies both the demand type and the cost type.
A PNRG is symmetric if all agents have the same demand type, i.e., Ai = A for all i . A PNRG
is a resource selection game (RSG) if G is a network of parallel links. at is, if the action of every
agent is to select a single (s, t) edge.
Flows. A flow (or action profile) of a PNRG is a vector f ∈ R |A |×m
+
, where fp,i is the amount of
agents of type i that use path p ∈ Ai . In a valid flow,
∑
p ∈Ai fp,i = ri for all i . e total traffic on
path p ∈ A is denoted by fp =
∑m
i=1 fp,i . Similarly, the total traffic on edge e ∈ E is denoted by
fe =
∑
p :e ∈p fp . Denote the support of type i strategy in flow f by Pi (f ) = {p ∈ A : fi,p > 0}. at
is, all paths used by type i agents in flow f .
e cost for an agent of type i in game G, selecting a path p ∈ Ai in flow f , is ci (p, f ) =∑
e ∈p cie (fe ).
Social cost. For an NRG (not player-specific), we denote by SCi (G, f ) =
∑
p ∈Ai fi,pc(p, f ) the
cost experienced by type i agents in flow f . By summing over all types, we get the social cost:
SC(G, f ) =
∑
i≤m
SCi (G, f ) =
∑
i≤m
∑
p ∈Pi (f )
fi,pc(p, f ) =
∑
e ∈E
ce (fe )fe
1We use the term cost rather than latency, to reflect that agents may care about other factors.
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us the social cost only depends on the total traffic per edge. We denote by f o(G) ∈ argminf SC(G, f )
some profile with minimal total cost, and OPT (G) = SC(G, f o(G)) = minf SC(G, f ).
Equilibrium. A flow f for an PNRG is an equilibrium in game G if for every agent type i , any
used path p ∈ Pi (f ) and any p ′ ∈ Ai , we have ci (p, f ) ≤ ci (p ′, f ). at is, if no agent can switch to
a path with a lower cost. is provides the analogy of a Nash equilibrium for nonatomic games.
It is known that in any NRG there is at least one equilibrium, and that this can be reached
by a simple best-response dynamic. Further, all equilibria have the same social cost and in every
equilibrium all agents of type i experience the same cost [1, 8, 33, 40]. Player-specific NRGs are also
guaranteed to have at least one equilibrium [41], however, equilibrium costs may not be unique,
and best-response dynamics may not converge, except in special cases [23].
Affine routing games. In an affine NRG, all cost functions take the form of a linear function.
at is, ce (x) = aex + be for some constants ae ≥ 0,be ≥ 0. e social cost can be wrien as
SC(G, f ) = ∑e ∈E ae (fe )2 + be fe . Pigou’s example is the special case of an affine RSG with two
resources, where c1(x) = 1 and c2(x) = ax . We denote by GP (a) the instance where c2(x) = ax
(see Fig. 1a).
e price of anarchy. Let EQ(G) be the set of equilibria in game G. e price of anarchy (PoA)
of a game is the ratio between the social cost in the worst equilibrium in EQ(G) and the optimal
social cost [29]. Formally, PoA(G) = supf ∗∈EQ (G) SC(G, f
∗)
OPT (G) . For example in affine NRGs, it is known
that PoA(G) ≤ 43 , and this bound is aained by the Pigou example of GP (1) [40].
Smoothness. A cost function c is (λ, µ)-smooth for λ ≥ 0, µ < 1 if for any x , x ′ ≥ 0, it holds that
c(x)x ′ ≤ λx ′c(x ′) + µxc(x). (1)
A NRG G is (λ, µ)-smooth if all cost functions in G are (λ, µ)-smooth. For any (λ, µ)-smooth
NRG, PoA(G) ≤ λ1−µ [16, 39].2 Moreover, w.l.o.g. λ = 1 (that is, for any class of cost functions
there is an optimal pair (1, µ) for some µ [15, 40]). For example, affine functions are (1, 14 )-smooth,
which again entails a PoA bound of 43 .
2.2 Serial-parallel Width
Consider a networkG = 〈V , E, s, t〉.
Definition 2.1. A set of edges S ⊆ E is parallel if there is some S ′ ⊆ E s.t. S ⊆ S ′, and S ′ is a
minimal cut between s and t in the networkG .
Definition 2.2. A set of edges S ⊆ E is serial if there is a simple directed s − t path p containing
S .
Definition 2.3 (Serial-parallel Width). e serial-parallel width of a network, SPW(G), is the size
of the largest set S ⊆ E that is both parallel and serial.
Intuitively, a serial-parallel width of k means there are at least k non-intersecting source-target
paths, and some additional path that edge-intersects all of them.
Example 2.4. Consider the Braess network in Fig. 1b (ignore the costs). eminimal s−t cuts are:
{sa, sb}, {at ,bt}, {sa,bt} and {sb,ab,at}. us the set {sa,bt} is both parallel and serial, which
means SPW(GB) ≥ 2. e set {sa,at} is serial but not parallel; and {sa, sb,ab} is neither. In fact,
2ementioned papers only require each ce to be smooth around the equilibrium flow x = f
∗
e . Our proofs require the cost
functions to be smooth at several different places, and hence the slight difference in the definition.
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(a) GP (a)
s
t
1 ax
(b) G
a b
s
t
x
2 1
1
x
2
0
(c) Gˆα for α = 3
a b
s
t
9x
2 1
1
9x
2
0
Figure 1. (1a) Pigou’s example. (1b) An objective game G (a quadratic variation of the Braess paradox). (1c)
The game Gˆα is the same game played by pessimistic agents with parameterα = 3. The biased costs of edges
with fixed costs like sb do not change, but the biased cost on the edge sa for example is cˆαsa (x) = csa (3x) =
(3x)2 = 9x2.
the only parallel set of size greater than 2 is {sb,ab,at}, which is not serial, thus SPW(GB ) < 3.
We conclude that the serial-parallel width of the Braess network is 2.
Definition 2.5. For any k ≥ 2, we define the k-serial-parallel graph GSP (k) as follows. G =
〈V , E, s, t〉, whereV = {s, t ,a2, . . . ,ak ,b1, . . . ,bk−1}, andE =
⋃k−1
i=2 {(s,ai ), (ai ,bi ), (bi , t), (bi ,ai+1)}∪
{(s,b1), (ak , t)}.
See Figure 2 for an example.
e 2-serial-parallel network is the Braess networkGB . e serial-parallel width of the k-serial-
parallel network is exactly k , where the parallel edges are {(s,b1), (a2,b2), . . . , (ak−1,bk−1), (ak , t)}.
e network GSP (k) was used in [5] to derive examples of games with high Price of Malice, and
we will use it later in a similar way. In a companion paper, Meir and Deligkas [31] proved that the
serial-parallel width of acyclic networks can be characterized completely, where SPW(G) < k if
and only if GSP (k) (or some small variants of which) is not embedded in G . For k = 1, this entails
another characterization.
Proposition 2.6 (Meir and Deligkas [31]). Let G be an acyclic network, then SPW(G) = 1 if
and only if G is series-parallel.
3 BOUNDING EXTERNALITIES
Suppose we are given a game G = 〈G,m, (c j )j≤m , s, t, r 〉, and agents play some equilibrium f ∗
of G. For any single type i , all type i agents have the same cost in f ∗. We denote this cost by
Ci,∗ = ci (p, f ∗), where p ∈ Pi (f ∗) is an arbitrary path used by a type i agent. Note that ri ·Ci,∗ =
SCi (G, f ∗).
Our goal in this section is to bound Ci,∗. A-priori, this may seem difficult, as we do not assume
anything about the types of the other agents. However, we will show that the negative externality
of the other types can be bounded using the structural parameters of the network G (the serial-
parallel width), and even adversarial agents cannot be much worse for i than more type i agents.
Given a game G and type i , we define a new game Gi by seing both the cost type and the
demand type of all agents in G to i . at is, Gi = 〈G, 1,ci , si , ti , r 〉. We also define a game G(k) =
〈G,m,c, s, t ,k · r 〉, where the demand in G is multiplied by k . Finally, we set Gi, (k) = (Gi )(k), i.e.,
G
i, (k) is a game where there all k ·r agents are of type i . Note thatGi, (1) = Gi , and denoteCi = Ci,1.
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Let д∗ be an equilibrium of Gi, (k). As Gi, (k) is a symmetric game, all agents have the same cost
in д∗. We denote this cost by Ci, (k) = ci (p,д∗), where p ∈ P(д∗) is an arbitrary used path.
Finally, let G |i =
〈
V i , Ei , si , ti
〉
be the network obtained from G = 〈V , E〉, by eliminating all
edges and vertices that are not in Ai .
e following bound is our main result in this section. Prop. 3.2 shows that the bound is tight.
Theorem 3.1 (Externality theorem). LetG be any PNRG played on a networkG . If SPW(G |i ) ≤
k , then Ci,∗ ≤ Ci, (k).
Before we prove the theorem, we explain its implications. For k = 1 (e.g., series-parallel net-
works), this means that there are no negative externalities due to type differences—the cost of
type i agents may only increase when all others are of the same type. We note that this result
(along with Prop. 3.2) strictly generalizes eorem 5 from [2], which is aained as a special case
for k = 1 and specific demand types (namely, agents that ignore certain edges); and eorem 5.7
in [35] which is aained as a special case for k = 1 and symmetric games. It also implies that the
Price of Malice [5] is 0 in series-parallel networks (this is since our theorems make no assumption
on the behavior of agents of other types).
For larger values of k , eorem 3.1 means that regardless of what the other agents are doing,
the cost to the type i agents is never more than their equilibrium cost in a game where all agents
are of type i , and their number is multiplied by k .
Proof. Denote P = Pi (д∗) (the set of paths p ∈ Ai s.t. д∗p,i > 0). Assume towards a contradiction
that Ci,∗ > Ci, (k). is means that ci (p, f ∗) > Ci, (k) = ci (p,д∗) for any path p ∈ P , as ci (p, f ∗) is
either Ci,∗ or higher. For any path p ∈ P ,
∑
e ∈p
cie (f ∗e ) = ci (p, f ∗) > ci (p,д∗) =
∑
e ∈p
cie (д∗e ),
thus there is an edge e = ep ∈ p s.t. cie (f ∗e ) > cie (д∗e ). Consider the set EP = {ep |p ∈ P}. Since cie is
monotone, this means f ∗e > д
∗
e for every edge e ∈ EP .
Consider the weighted directed graph H = 〈V , F 〉, where F = {e ∈ p |p ∈ P}, and the capacity
(weight) of every edge e ∈ F is д∗e .
By construction, EP is a cut between si and ti in H . Let E ⊆ EP s.t. E is a minimal cut (not
necessarily of minimum size or minimum weight), then∑
e ∈E
f ∗e >
∑
e ∈E
д∗e ≥ k · r . (2)
e first inequality is since f ∗e > д
∗
e holds for every e ∈ EP and thus for every e ∈ E. e second
inequality follows from the min-cut-max-flow theorem, since E is some si − ti cut in H , and the
flow between si , ti is exactly k · r in any valid flow of Gi, (k) (which by definition has a mass of k · r
type i agents).
Now, as there are only r agents inG = (G,m, (ci )i≤m, s, t , r ), then by Eq. (2) and the pigeon-hole
principle there must be some agents in profile f ∗ using strictly more than k edges from the set E.
Choose some path used by such an agent and denote it by p ′ ∈ Ai . We define S = p ′ ∩ E, thus by
our selection of p ′, |S | > k .
Finally, all edges of S are contained in the minimal cut E between si , ti (thus S is parallel), and
S is also contained by the simple path p ′ (thus S is serial). By definition of serial-parallel width,
SPW(G |i ) ≥ |S | > k , which is a contradiction to our assumption. 
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b1
a2
b2
a3
b3
ak−1
bk−1
ak
s = a1
t = bk
c
s
t
c sa c s
a csa
c a
b
c a
b
c a
b
c
bt
c
b
t cbt
c ba
c b
a
c ba
c ab
c
bt
csa
c ab
Figure 2. The solid edges compose the networkGSP (k). The edge labels are used in Prop. 3.2 and 5.4, where
edges with the same label (e.g. cab ) have the same cost function. The dashed (s, t) edge is not part ofGSP (k)
and is used only in Prop. 5.4.
3.1 Lower bound
We say that a class of cost functions is nontrivial if it contains all constant functions, as well as at
least one strictly increasing function.
eorem 3.1 is tight in a very strong sense: the bound cannot be improved for any network and
any nontrivial class of cost functions.
Proposition 3.2. Let any k ≥ 2, network G with SPW(G) = k , any nontrivial class of cost func-
tions C, and any δ > 0. ere is a game with two types G = 〈G, (c1,c2), s, t , r 〉, such that c1e , c2e ∈ C
for all e ∈ E, and C1,∗ > C1, (k) − δ .
Proof. We first prove for the k-Serial-Parallel networkGSP (k). e demand type of both agents
is (s, t), thus all paths from s to t are valid strategies. We define edge costs as follows. Recall that
C contains all constant functions, and at least one strictly increasing function c . For type i = 1,
we set ci
ab
(x) = c(x). e cost of all other edges is 0. For type j = 2, we set c j
ab
(x) = c j
ba
(x) =
0, c
j
sa(x) = c jbt (x) = c(1). We set ri = ϵ (ϵ will be determined later) and r j = 1 − ϵ .
us in the unique equilibrium д∗ of game Gi, (k), the agents (k in total) split evenly over all k
short paths, and Ci, (k) = ci
ab
(kk ) = ciab (1) = c(1).
In the unique equilibrium f ∗ of gameG, all type j agents take the long pathp = (s,b1,a2,b2, . . . ,bk−1,ak , t)
since c j (p, f ∗) = 0. e type i agents split evenly over all k short paths , and thus each experiences
a cost of Ci,∗ = ci
ab
(r j + rik ) = c(r j + rik ) > c(r j ).
Let ϵ > 0 such that c(1− ϵ) > c(1) − δ . Since c is continuous and strictly increasing such ϵ must
exist. Finally,
Ci,∗ > c(r j ) = c(1 − ϵ) > c(1) − δ = c(1) = Ci, (k) − δ , as required.
Now, consider an arbitrary network G with SPW(G) ≥ k . Consider some serial-parallel set S of
size k and the path p that contains it, and S will play the role of the ab edges above. Specifically,
For type i agents we set cie ≡ ciab ≡ c for any e ∈ S , and cie ≡ c ≡ 0 for all other edges. For type j ,
we set c
j
e ≡ 0 for all e ∈ p, and c je ≡ c(1) for all other edges. It is easy to verify that Ci,∗,Ci, (k) are
the same as forGSP (k). 
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4 BIASED PRICE OF ANARCHY
Given an NRG G = 〈G,m,c, s, t, r 〉 and modified cost functions cˆie for every type i ≤ m and edge
e ∈ E, we obtain a PNRG Gˆ = 〈G,m, (cˆi )i≤m, s, t , r 〉. We assume that agents act based on their
modified cost functions, irrespective of whether this is a rational behavior or not. We refer to Gˆ as
the biased game, where every agent of type i experiences a cost of cˆie rather than ce . Both games
G and Gˆ have a role in our model, and we oen denote the overall seing as G = 〈G, Gˆ〉. e
way we interpret G is that agents play the biased game Gˆ (and thus, it is the equilibria of Gˆ that
maer), whereas their true costs are according to game G. We say that G is uniform if all agents
in Gˆ have the same cost type (same bias).
Biased Price of Anarchy. We measure the price of anarchy in a game with biased costs by com-
paring the equilibria of Gˆ (denoted by fˆ
∗
) to the optimum of G. Formally:
BPoA(G) = BPoA(G, Gˆ) = sup
fˆ
∗∈EQ (Gˆ)
SC(G, fˆ ∗)
OPT (G) . (3)
In the uniform bias case where cˆi = cˆ for all i , the game Gˆ is just another NRG. Chen et al. [13]
referred to the BPoA (when applied to altruism) as the Robust PoA. e Price of Risk Aversion [35]
and the Deviation Ratio [28] are similar concepts to the BPoA, except they compare fˆ
∗
to the
equilibrium of the unbiased game G.
A simple example of a biased cost is induced by pessimism, which is one way to model risk-
aversion [32]. Suppose that whenever faced with some expected load fe on edge e , an agent takes
a safety margin by playing as if the actual load is α · fe (for some fixed private parameter α ≥ 1).
Such an agent will play as if every cost function ce is replaced with a new cost function cˆ
α
e , where
cˆαe (x) = ce (αx) (see Fig. 1). We denote the (uniform) game where all agents play according to
(cˆαe )e ∈E by Gˆα .
Example 4.1. In the optimal flow of the objective game G in Fig. 1, the amount of agents taking
the long path is ∼ 0.155, and thus OPT (G)  1.23. e equilibrium f ∗ of G is suboptimal (as all
agents take the long path s − a −b − t ), and PoA(G)  21.23 = 1.626. In contrast, in the equilibrium
fˆ
∗
of Gˆα for α = 3 (Fig. 1c), agents divide equally among the two short paths, which leads to
BPoA(G, Gˆα )  1.251.23 = 1.016.
Interestingly, the bias of the agents on Example 4.1 somewhat mitigates the increase in social
cost that is incurred by rational behavior.
4.1 Smoothness for Biased Costs
Our goal is to provide bounds on the biased Price of Anarchy for a given game with biased costs
〈G, Gˆ〉. at each of ce and cˆie are smooth is insufficient to provide such a bound.
Example 4.2. Consider a Pigou game with pessimistic agents Gα = 〈Gα , Gˆαα 〉 where Gα =
GP (2/α) and thus Gˆαα = GP (2). For any α the equilibrium of Gˆαα (and thus of Gα ) is the same:
1/2 of all agents use each resource. However as α increases, the optimal flow of Gα shis more
agents to the resource with variable cost, and the optimal social cost decreases to 0. us the gap
between the equilibrium cost and the optimal cost (the BPoA) goes to infinity with α even though
both of Gα , Gˆ
α
α are affine.
It is crucial, then, to extend the definition of smoothness to gameswith biased costs in a way that
takes into account both c and cˆ . is technique has been applied before for specific modified costs,
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for example nonatomic gameswith restricted tolls [9] and atomic games with altruistic agents [12].
We provide a general extension.
Definition 4.3. Let λ ≥ 0, µ < 1. e function c is (λ, µ)-biased-smoothw.r.t. biased cost function
cˆ , if for any x , x ′ ∈ R+,
c(x)x + cˆ(x)(x ′ − x) ≤ λc(x ′)x ′ + µc(x)x . (4)
It is instructive to check the familiar case where there is no bias. Indeed, if cˆ = c , and c is
(λ, µ)-smooth, then
c(x)x + cˆ(x)(x ′ − x) = c(x)x + c(x)(x ′ − x) = c(x)x ′ ≤ λc(x ′)x ′ + µc(x)x ,
and Eq. (4) collapses to “standard” smoothness (Eq. (1)).
Recall that the PoA of a (λ, µ)-smooth game is bounded by λ1−µ . is bound extends to games
with biased costs that are biased-smooth and when all agents have the same bias. is was explic-
itly shown for specific biases, but we write down the general formulation for completeness.
Theorem 4.4 (Bonifaci et al. [9]). Consider a uniform game with biased costs G = 〈G, Gˆ〉 where
every cost function ce is (λˆ, µˆ)-biased smooth w.r.t. biased cost function cˆe . Let fˆ
∗ ∈ EQ(Gˆ), and f
any valid flow. en SC(G, fˆ ∗) ≤ λˆ1−µˆ SC(G, f ).
In particular, BPoA(G, Gˆ) ≤ λˆ1−µˆ .
Proof. e proof extends the standard proof of PoA bounds for nonatomic congestion games
via smoothness arguments. In any equilibrium fˆ
∗
, the variational inequality
∑
e cˆe ( fˆ ∗e ) fˆ ∗e ≤
∑
e cˆe ( fˆ ∗e )fe
holds (see [16, 39]). us,
SC(G, fˆ ∗) ≤ SC(G, fˆ ∗) +
∑
e
cˆe ( fˆ ∗e )fe −
∑
e
cˆe ( fˆ ∗e ) fˆ ∗e
≤
∑
e
[λˆce (fe )fe + µˆce ( fˆ ∗e ) fˆ ∗e ] = λˆSC(G, f ) + µˆSC(G, fˆ
∗).
We get the bound by reorganizing the terms. e only part that differs from the standard smooth-
ness is the first inequality. 
An alternative derivation of optimal tolls. We can also check that the extension provides the
right result in regard to modified costs c˜(x) = c(x) + c ′(x)x (where c ′(x) = ∂c(x )
∂x
) that represent
optimal tolls and should lead to optimal play [7]. Let’s confirm this result via a biased-smoothness
argument.
Observation 4.5. If we set modified cost c˜(x) = c(x)+ c ′(x)x , then cost function c is (1, 0)-biased
smooth w.r.t. to c˜ .
is follows immediately from the convexity ofxc(x), and affirmsviaeorem4.4 that BPoA(G, G˜) =
1 for any game. For example, adding optimal tolls to the game in Fig. 1b will set c˜sa(x) = c˜bt (x) =
3x2, and in the only equilibrium, SC(G, f ∗) = 1.23 = OPT (G).
4.2 Bounds for Specific Biases
eorem 4.4 lets us bound the BPoA of a population of agents with uniform bias, and in the next
sections we will prove theorems that bound the BPoA of populations with heterogeneous biases.
However, all these theorems require some explicit bounds on the biased smoothness parameters
λˆ and µˆ in a given scenario (i.e., for the specific bias and specific class of cost functions).
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(a) Maximal values of λˆ, µˆ under various biases
Bias Pessimism Toll-sensitivity / Altruism Risk-Aversion Small error
Params. α ≤ 2 α ≥ 2 β ≤ 1 β ≥ 1 any γ , τ any δ , δˆ
λˆ 1 α
2
4α−4 1
(β+1)2
4β
1 + γτ 1 + δ
µˆ 1 + α
2
4 − α 0
(β+1)2
4 − β 0 14 1 − 34(1+δˆ )
(b) BPoA(Gα )
2 4 6
1
1.5
2
α
B
P
oA
Figure 3. Biased-smoothness bounds for affine cost functions. For a trivial bias of α = 1, β = 0, γτ = 0, or
δ = δˆ = 0, we always get the familiar affine smoothness of (λˆ = 1, µˆ = 14 ). The bound on Altruism with β ≤ 1
is due to Chen et al. [13]. The bound on small error is due to Prop. 6.2 applied to affine cost functions. The
proofs for all other bounds are in Appendix C.
ere are by now many such studied biases. We already introduced pessimism, which depends
on a single parameter α , and where the biased cost is cˆαe (x) = ce (αx). Toll-sensitive agents [14]
have a single parameter β , and their biased cost is cˆ
β
e (x) = ce (x)+ βxc ′e (x) (meaning that marginal
tolls are imposed, but agents discount or over-weigh them by a factor of β). Altruist agents [13]
have exactly the same biased cost function as tolls, except that now β should be interpreted as
how much they care about hurting others. In the Mean-Var risk-aversion model [34, 35], ce (x) is a
distribution over costs, and the biased cost is cˆ
γ
e (x) = E[ce (x)]+γVAR[ce (x)], i.e., γ represents the
sensitivity of agents to variance. We assume thatVAR[ce (x)] ≤ τ for some constant τ . Small error
means that c and cˆ are within a small multiplicative factor of 1+δ from one another (see Sec. 6 for
details).
Figure 3 summarizes known biased smoothness bounds for routing games with affine cost func-
tions (see Appendix C for bounds for more general classes of cost functions). Note that from every
column in the table we can derive a BPoA bound via eorem 4.4. For example, for any biased
game
〈
G, Gˆα
〉
where all cost functions in G are affine, and all agents in Gˆ are pessimistic with pa-
rameter α ≤ 2, we have BPoA(G, Gˆα ) ≤ 4
4α−α 2 . is bound, which is tight, is illustrated in Fig. 3b.
Note that for certain values of α , the BPoA is lower than the PoA, i.e., bias steers the society to
beer outcomes (we also saw this phenomenon in Example 4.1).
We note that BPoA bounds have also been derived independently using different techniques by
Nikolova and Stier-Moses [35], by Meir and Parkes [32] and by Kleer at al. [28].
5 STRUCTURE-DEPENDENT BOUNDS
In this section, we derive a bound, tight up to a constant, on the equilibrium cost for agents partici-
pating in a game with heterogeneous biases. is bound depends on their own biased-smoothness
parameters, as well as on the structure of the network. In some cases, this also allows us to derive
BPoA bounds that depend on the average bias. Most importantly, our bounds in this section do
not assume any specific class of cost functions, and work for any function and any bias, as long as
biased smoothness holds.
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5.1 Upper bound
Our primary question is whether we can get a bound on the social cost of any equilibrium of G in
terms of the smoothness parameters of all types, and the optimal social cost.
In the next theorem and corollaries, each ce is (λ, µ)-smooth (as per Eq. (1)), each cˆie is (λi , µi )-
smooth , and ce is (λˆi , µˆi )-biased-smooth w.r.t. cˆie (as per Def. 4.3). Recall that rir is the fraction of
agents of type i .
Theorem 5.1 (Smoothness theorem). Consider any game with biased costs G = 〈G, Gˆ〉 where
SPW(G) ≤ k . Let fˆ ∗ be an equilibrium of Gˆ. en for any type i ,
SCi (G, fˆ
∗) ≤ ri
r
λλi λˆi
(1 − √µ)2(1 − µi )(1 − µˆi )
1
k
OPT (Gi, (k)).
In simple words, the theorem says that for every agent type, the equilibrium cost to all ri agents
of this type may increase (compared to the optimal cost) by a factor that only depends on the
smoothness of cost functions, their own bias, and the structure of the network, but not on the
biases of other types. is result is bi-criteria, as we compare to the optimum of a game with
higher demand. Since costs are increasing functions, 1kOPT (Gi, (k)) is increasing in k .
Lemma 5.2. For every x > 0, and every type i , it holds that:
(a) cˆi (x) ≥ (1 − µˆi )c(x);3 and (b) cˆi (x) ≤ λλˆi(1−√µ)2 c(x).
Proof. For (a), define quantity x ′ = 0, so that by (λˆi , µˆi )-biased-smoothness,
x(c(x) − cˆi (x)) = c(x)x + cˆi (x)(x ′ − x) ≤ λˆic(x ′)x ′ + µˆic(x)x = µˆic(x)x .
Hence c(x) − cˆi (x) ≤ µˆic(x).
For (b), set q =
√
1/µ and consider x ′ = qx .
c(x)x + cˆi (x)(x ′ − x) ≤ λˆic(x ′)x ′ + µˆic(x)x ⇒
c(x)x + cˆi (x)(q − 1)x ≤ λˆic(qx)qx + µˆic(x)x ⇒
cˆi (x) ≤ q
q − 1 λˆ
ic(qx) + (µˆi − 1)c(x) ≤ q
q − 1 λˆ
ic(qx) (µˆi ≤ 1)
Since c is (λ, µ)-smooth, c(qx)x ≤ λc(x)x + µc(qx)qx for every x > 0, and thus c(qx) ≤ λ1−qµ c(x).
Finally,
cˆi (x) ≤ λˆiλ q(q − 1)(1 − qµ)c(x) =
λλˆi
(1 − √µ)2 c(x),
as required. 
Proof sketch of Theorem 5.1. Let дˆ∗ be an equilibrium of Gˆi, (k). Define Cˆi,∗ = cˆi (p, fˆ ∗) for
some used pathp ∈ Pi ( fˆ
∗), and Cˆi, (k) = cˆi (p, дˆ∗) for some used pathp ∈ Pi (дˆ∗). In words, Cˆi,∗, Cˆi, (k)
are the perceived costs to agents of type i in equilibria fˆ ∗ and дˆ∗, respectively. Note that they are
not affected by which used path we choose.
e next steps are: to upper bound the ratio between rk · Cˆi, (k) = SC(Gˆi, (k), дˆ∗) andOPT (Gi, (k)),
using Lemma 5.2(b) on every used edge; and to lower bound Cˆi,∗ by the true cost c(p, fˆ ∗) of path
p, using Lemma 5.2(a) on all edges of p. e most important part is the inequality Cˆi,∗ ≤ Cˆi, (k),
which is due to eorem 3.1 applied to the biased game Gˆ.
3For some biases (e.g. tolls), we have a tighter inequality cˆ i (x ) ≥ c(x ) from the definition. In such cases we can eliminate
the factor 1 − µˆ i in eorem 5.1 and all following corollaries.
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Finally, recall that what we need to bound is social cost for all type i agents in the “real game”
G, which is SCi (G, fˆ
∗). Since each such type i agent has a cost of exactly c(p, fˆ ∗), we now chain
all the previous inequalities to get the desired upper bound. 
5.2 Implications
eorem 5.1 has a number of useful corollaries. Some use the fact that for series-parallel networks
k = 1 (Prop. 2.6).
Corollary 5.3. Consider any game with biased costs G = 〈G, Gˆ〉 where SPW(G) ≤ k . Let fˆ ∗ be
an equilibrium of G. For any type i :
(1) if G is affine, SCi (G, fˆ
∗) ≤ 4 ri
r
λi λˆi
(1−µ i )(1−µˆ i )k ·OPT (Gi );
(2) if type i is unbiased, SCi (G, fˆ
∗) ≤ ri
r
λ
1−µ
1
k
OPT (Gi, (k)).
Moreover, if G is symmetric, then:
(3) SC(G, fˆ ∗) ≤
(∑
i≤m
ri
r
λλi λˆi
(1−√µ)2(1−µ i )(1−µˆ i )
)
1
kOPT (G(k));
(4) if G is affine, BPoA(G) ≤ O(1)k ∑i≤m rir λˆi1−µˆ i ;
(5) If G is series-parallel, then BPoA(G) ≤ O(1)∑i≤m rir λˆi1−µˆ i .
ese corollaries provide us withmore explicit bounds. In particular: (1) for affine cost functions
we can get rid of the bi-criteria result since the optimal social cost is linear in the demand (more
generally, for polynomials of degree d the factor becomesO(kd )). (2) entails that in a seing where
most agents are unbiased and there is only a small fraction of adversarial agents (as in [5]), the
damage to the unbiased agents is limited. (3)-(5) show that the equilibrium social cost in symmetric
games depends on the average bias over all agents: each type of biased agents can only increase
the social cost by a factor that is proportional to their mass (and also affected by the serial-parallel
width of the network). Kleer at al. [28] proved a result similar in spirit to our Corollary 5.3(5), but
restricted to toll-sensitivity.
5.3 Lower Bounds
Our main theorems both rely on the restricted structure of the underlying network. Prop. 3.2
already shows the necessity of this restriction when some agents behave adversarially.
We next show that the neither smoothness parameters (λˆi , µˆi ) nor the structural parameter
k = SPW(G) can be relaxed in eorem 5.1 and in its corollaries.
Proposition 5.4. Let k ≥ 2, any smoothness parameters (λˆi , µˆi ), and any ri < 12 . ere is an affine
symmetric game with biases G = 〈G, Gˆ〉 with SPW(G) = k , such that in the unique equilibrium fˆ ∗
of Gˆ, the cost for all type i agents increases by a factor of Ω(1) λˆi
1−µˆ i k compared to OPT (G).
Proof sketch. e proof uses the k-Serial-Parallel network GSP (k) with one additional edge
est (see Fig. 2). We define the real costs as follows: csa = cbt = cba ≡ 0, cst ≡ q2 , cab (x) = x ,
where q = λˆ
i
1−µˆ i . Note all edges of the form (ai ,bi ) have the same cost cab and likewise for the
other edges. In the flow of G where all agents split evenly, the cost is Co = 1k . In the biased game,
cˆi
ab
(x) = qx (thus λˆi
1−µˆ i ≤
q
1−0 = q), and we modify all other agents so they prefer the long path
that intersects all short paths. us in equilibrium fˆ
∗
all type i agents use edge est for a cost of
q
2 ≥ λˆ
i
2(1−µˆ i ) ≥ λˆ
i
2(1−µˆ i )k ·Co . 
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2016.
1:14 Reshef Meir and David Parkes
Since we only used affine cost functions, the bounds in both eorem 5.1 and Cor. 5.3(1) are
tight up to a constant. Also, since the network used in the proof is embedded inGSP (k+1), and thus
embedded in any acyclic network with SPW(G) > k (due to [31]), the example in Prop. 5.4 can be
constructed for any acyclic network G with SPW(G) ≥ k + 1.
6 STRUCTURE-INDEPENDENT BOUNDS
In this section, we leverage known PoA bounds in routing games with player-specific costs [23]
to obtain BPoA bounds in biased games with heterogeneous agents. ese are bounds that do not
depend on the network structure, but only on the cost functions and agents’ biases.
e bounds in this section are typically worse than those in Section 5, as they depend on the
worst bias rather than the average bias, and this dependency is polynomial rather than linear. Yet,
these bounds hold regardless of network structure.
For two cost functionsc, cˆ and r > 0, denote by∆(c, cˆ, r ) = supx ∈[0,r ] c(x )cˆ(x ) . LetΨ(G) = maxi, j≤m maxe ∈E ∆(cie , c
j
e , r ).
Theorem 6.1 (Gairing et al. [23]). Consider any PNRG G =
〈
G, (ci )i≤m, r
〉
where ci are poly-
nomials of degree d for all i . en PoA(G) ≤ (d + 1) · Ψ(G)d .4
Intuitively, the PoA is low if for each edge e and any x , all functions (cie (x))i≤m aain similar
values. We can use this PoA bound to prove a similar BPoA bound that is independent of the
network structure. Given a game with biased costs G = 〈G, Gˆ〉, let:
• Φ(G) = maxi≤m maxe ∈E ∆(cˆie , ce , r );
• Φ(G) = maxi≤m maxe ∈E ∆(ce , cˆie , r );
• and Ψ(G) = Ψ(Gˆ).
We first observe that∆ is tightly related to biased-smoothness, as biased-smoothness bounds entail
bounds on ∆, and vice versa.
Proposition 6.2. Consider c, cˆ such that c is (λ, µ)-smooth, ∆(c, cˆ, r ) ≤ 1+δ , and ∆(cˆ, c, r ) ≤ 1+δˆ
for some δ , δˆ ≥ 0 and any r > 0. en c is
(
(1 + δ )λ, µ+δˆ
1+δˆ
)
-biased-smooth w.r.t. cˆ .
Proposition 6.3. Consider c, cˆ such that c is (λ, µ)-smooth, and (λˆ, µˆ)-biased smooth w.r.t. cˆ . en
for any r > 0 ∆(c, cˆ, r ) ≤ 11−µˆ ; ∆(cˆ, c, r ) ≤ λ(1−√µ )2 λˆ. Also, if c is a polynomial of degree at most d ,
∆(cˆ, c, r ) ≤ (d + 1) · e · λˆ, where e is the natural logarithm base.
Proposition 6.3 follows from Lemma 5.2 and from the smoothness of polynomial functions. Next,
we derive a BPoA bound. Due to tightness results on the PoA [23], we cannot hope to significantly
improve the bound in this approach.
Theorem 6.4. Consider any game G = 〈G, Gˆ〉 where all of cˆie are polynomials of degree at most
d . en BPoA(G) ≤ (d + 1)(Φ(G)Φ(G))d+1.
Proof sketch. Consider an equilibrium flow fˆ
∗ ∈ EQ(Gˆ). We use the definitions of Φ,Φ to
show that SC(G, fˆ ∗) ≤ Φ(G)Φ(G)PoA(Gˆ). We then apply the bound PoA(Gˆ) ≤ (d + 1) · Ψ(G)d
fromeorem 6.1, and show that Ψ(Gˆ) = Ψ(G) ≤ Φ(G)Φ(G). 
Finally, we can combine Proposition 6.3 and eorem 6.4 to obtain a BPoA bound that depends
only on the smoothness parameters of the “worst” type:
4e tight bound ( m. 4.10 in Gairing et al. [23]) is beer by a factor of up to (d + 1), however we are mainly interested
in the fact that it is independent of the network structure, and so we use a simplified form.
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2016.
Playing the Wrong Game: Bounding Externalities in Diverse Populations of Agents 1:15
Corollary 6.5. Consider any game with biased costs G = 〈G, Gˆ〉 where for all i ≤ m and e ∈ E:
(a) ce , cˆ
i
e are polynomials of degree at most d ; and (b) ce is (λˆ, µˆ)-biased smooth w.r.t. cˆie .
en BPoA(G) ≤ (d + 1)d+2ed+1
(
λˆ
1−µˆ
)d+1
.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We have considered strategic seings in which participants are making routing decisions based on
individually perceived costs. From the perspective of a system analyst who considers the objective
costs, the agents’ behavior deviates from optimal self-interested play. Whether these deviations
come from a cognitive limitation, subjective preferences, a behavioral bias, or external influence
such as tolls, it is important to understand how the equilibria of the game are affected.
Our work is the first to provide (Biased) PoA bounds for populations with heterogeneous arbi-
trary biases, and the first to consider heterogeneous biases in general networks. Our main results
(Sec. 3 and 5) bound the equilibrium cost of each agent type separately, based only on their own
biases and on the structure of the network. When considering the entire population, this entails
a bi-criteria bound on the social cost (in some cases can be wrien as a Biased PoA bound) that
depends on the average bias in the population. ese results can help estimate the worst case effect
when the exact structure of the population is not known in advance: one only has to know the
smoothness bounds of each type and a bound on the quantity of each type.
Since in nonatomic routing games all mixed and correlated equilibria have the same social cost
anyway [8], smoothness does not add more “robustness,” and is thus perhaps considered less inter-
esting in such games. Our results show that smoothness is useful for a different kind of robustness,
namely to heterogeneous biases.
An additional result (Sec. 6) relies on the PoA of the heterogeneous “wrong” game, and while it
does not require the network to have a particular structure, it provides bounds stated in terms of
the worst bias in the population, and only applies for polynomial cost functions. We can think of
these results as bounding the negative externalities of each type on all others, whereas the results
in Sections 3 and 5 bound the externalities that all others may inflict on agents of type i .
We hope that our results and techniques will inspire further progress in understanding both the
effect of network topology and the effect of bounded rationality on equilibria.
Some challenges are to derive BPoA bounds that only depend on the average bias (i.e., not on
the network structure); and bounds on the negative externality that become negligible for a small
amount of adversarial agents.
Biased smoothness can also be applied to obtain robust PoA bounds in atomic congestion games
and other normal form games (i.e. for mixed and correlated equilibria), by extending the standard
smoothness definition as in [13]. An important open question is whether atomic games with
heterogeneous biases can be similarly analyzed, by showing biased-smoothness independently
for each type of agent.
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A STRUCTURE-DEPENDENT BOUNDS
Lemma A.1. SC(Gˆi, (k), дˆ∗) ≤ λλi λˆi(1−√µ )2(1−µ i )OPT (Gi, (k)).
Proof. Since by definition Gˆi (and thus also Gˆi, (k)) is (λi , µi )-smooth, for any flow f of Gˆi, (k),
SC(Gˆi, (k), дˆ∗) ≤ λ
i
1 − µi SC(Gˆ
i, (k), f ). (5)
We denote the optimal flow in Gi, (k) by дo = f o(Gi, (k)).
SC(Gˆi, (k), дˆ∗) ≤ λ
i
1 − µi SC(Gˆ
i, (k),дo) = λ
i
1 − µi
∑
e ∈E
дoe cˆ
i
e (дoe ) (By (5) with f = дo)
≤ λ
i
1 − µi
∑
e ∈E
дoe
(
λλˆi
(1 − √µ)2 ce (д
o
e )
)
(from Lemma 5.2(b))
=
λλi λˆi
(1 − √µ)2(1 − µi )
∑
e ∈E
дoe ce (дoe ) =
λλi λˆi
(1 − √µ)2(1 − µi )OPT (G
i, (k)),
as required. 
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Theorem 5.1. Consider any game with biased costs G = 〈G, Gˆ〉 where SPW(G) ≤ k . Let fˆ ∗ be an
equilibrium of Gˆ. en for any type i ,
SCi (G, fˆ
∗) ≤ ri
r
λλi λˆi
(1 − √µ)2(1 − µi )(1 − µˆi )
1
k
OPT (Gi, (k)).
Proof. Similarly to the definitions before eorem 3.1, we define fˆ
∗
as an equilibrium of Gˆ,
Cˆi,∗ = cˆi (p, fˆ ∗) for some used path p ∈ Pi ( fˆ
∗), and Cˆi, (k) = cˆi (p, дˆ∗) for some used path p ∈ Pi (дˆ∗).
Note that Cˆi,∗, Cˆi, (k) are not effected by which used path we choose.
By eorem 3.1 applied to games Gˆ, Gˆi, (k),
r · Cˆi,∗ ≤ r · Cˆi, (k) = 1
k
(r · k)Cˆi, (k) = 1
k
(
∑
p ∈A
дˆ∗p )Cˆi, (k) =
1
k
∑
p ∈P i (дˆ∗)
дˆ∗p cˆi (p, дˆ∗) =
1
k
SC(Gˆi, (k), дˆ∗).
On the other hand, for any used path p ∈ Pi ( fˆ ∗), by Lemma 5.2(a)
Cˆi,∗ = cˆi (p, fˆ ∗) =
∑
e ∈p
cˆie ( fˆ ∗e ) ≥
∑
e ∈p
(1 − µˆi )ce ( fˆ ∗e ) = (1 − µˆi )c(p, fˆ
∗).
Combining the above bounds, we get an upper bound on the total cost for all type i agents:
SCi (G, fˆ ∗) =
∑
p ∈A
fˆ ∗i,pc(p, fˆ
∗) ≤
∑
p ∈A
fˆ ∗i,p
Cˆi,∗
1 − µˆi =
riCˆ
i,∗
1 − µˆi =
ri (r · Cˆi,∗)
r (1 − µˆi ) ≤
ri
r
1
(1 − µˆi )
1
k
SC(Gˆi, (k), дˆ∗).
Finally, we get the theorem by plugging in the bound of Lemma A.1. 
Corollary 5.3. Consider any game with biased costs G = 〈G, Gˆ〉 where SPW(G) ≤ k . Let fˆ ∗ be
an equilibrium of G. For any type i :
(1) if G is affine, SCi (G, fˆ
∗) ≤ 4 rir λ
i λˆi
(1−µ i )(1−µˆ i )k ·OPT (Gi );
(2) if type i is unbiased, SCi (G, fˆ
∗) ≤ ri
r
λ
1−µ
1
k
OPT (Gi, (k)).
Moreover, if G is symmetric, then:
(3) SC(G, fˆ ∗) ≤
(∑
i≤m
ri
r
λλi λˆi
(1−√µ)2(1−µ i )(1−µˆ i )
)
1
k
OPT (G(k));
(4) if G is affine, BPoA(G) ≤ O(1)k ∑i≤m rir λˆi1−µˆ i ;
(5) If G is series-parallel, then BPoA(G) ≤ O(1)∑i≤m rir λˆi1−µˆ i .
Proof. (1) First, for affine functions, λ = 1, µ = 14 , thus
λ
(1−√µ)2 =
1
1/4 = 4 (by Lemma. A.2
there is no beer pair (λ, µ)). Second, for any k ≥ 1 and any flow fˆ in G,
SC(G,k · fˆ ) =
∑
e ∈E
(k · fe )ce (k · fe ) =
∑
e ∈E
(k · fe )(ae · k · fe +be ) ≤ k2
∑
e ∈E
fe (ae fe +be ) = k2SC(G, fˆ ),
thusOPT (Gi, (k)) = SC(G, f o(Gi, (k))) ≤ SC(G,k · f o(Gi )) ≤ k2SC(G, f o(Gi )) = k2OPT (Gi ).
We get the corollary by replacing the respective terms in eorem 5.1. More generally, for
degree-d polynomials, the approximation factor isO(kd ).
(2) Strictly speaking, Cor. 5.3(2) is not entailed by eorem 5.1. Proof is by following the
same steps of the proof of eorem 5.1, except for Lemma 5.2, which becomes redundant
for unbiased agents (see Footnote 3). us λλˆ
i
(1−√µ )2(1−µˆ i ) can be omied from the bound,
which leaves us with λ
i
1−µ i =
λ
1−µ since cˆ
i
= ci .
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(3) is is since if G is symmetric, then Gi = G and Gi, (k) = G(k) for all i and k . us
SC(G, fˆ ∗) =
∑
i≤m
SCi (G, fˆ
∗) ≤
(∑
i≤k
ri
r
λλi λˆi
(1 − √µ)2(1 − µi )(1 − µˆi )
)
1
k
OPT (G(k)).
(4) From (1),
SC(G, fˆ ∗) =
∑
i≤m
SCi (G, fˆ ∗) ≤
∑
i≤m
4
ri
r
λi λˆi
(1 − µi )(1 − µˆi )k ·OPT (G
i ) = 4kOPT (G)
∑
i≤m
ri
r
λi λˆi
(1 − µi )(1 − µˆi ) .
(5) Follows immediately from (3) with k = 1.

A.1 A single smoothness parameter
For a given class of cost functions, we denote their smoothness parameters by (λ, µλ), i.e. by fixing
λ ≥ 1 (necessary for any class that includes constant functions), and finding the minimal µ = µλ
such that all functions in the class are (λ, µ) smooth. Recall that λ1−µλ is always minimized for
λ = 1 [15].
Lemma A.2. For polynomial functions, λ(1−√µ
λ
)2 is minimized for λ = 1.
We suspect that this is true for any function class that includes all constant functions.
Proof. Consider any class of polynomial functions of degree at most d . It is not hard to show
that µλ =
dλ
(λ(1+d ))1+ 1d
= λ−
1
d
d
(1+d )1+ 1d
(similar to the smoothness bounds in [15]).
us
λ
(1 − √µ)2 =
λ(
1 −
√
λ−
1
d
d
(1+d )1+ 1d
)2 = λ(
1 − λ− 12d d
(1+d ) d+12d
)2
=
1(
λ−
1
2 − λ− 12 λ− 12d d
(1+d ) d+12d
)2
=
1(
λ−
1
2 − λ− d+12d d
(1+d ) d+12d
)2 = 1y(λ)2
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Now, ∂λ
− 1
2
∂λ
= − 12λ−
3
2 , whereas
∂
(
λ−
d+1
2d
d
(1+d ) d+12d
)
∂λ
= −d + 1
2d
d
(1 + d) d+12d
λ−
d+3
2d
= − 1
2(1 + d) d+12d −1
λ−
d+3
2d
= − 1
2(1 + d)− d−12d
λ−
d+3
2d
= −1
2
λ
d+3
2d (1 + d) d−12d
It thus holds that for the derivative of y(λ):
y′(λ) = −1
2
(
λ
d+3
2d (1 + d) d−12d − λ− 32
)
≤ 0 ⇐⇒(
λ
d+3
2d (1 + d) d−12d − λ− 32
)
≥ 0 ⇐⇒
λ
d+3
2d (1 + d) d−12d ≥ λ− 32 ⇐⇒
λ
d+3
2d λ
3
2 ≥ (1 + d)− d−12d ⇐⇒
λ
4d+3
2d ≥ (1 + d)− d−12d ⇐⇒
λ4d+3 ≥ (1 + d)−(d−1) ⇐⇒
λ ≥ (1 + d)− d−14d+3
Note that the last right-hand expression is upper-bounded by 1 for all d ≥ 1. In particular for all
λ ≥ 1, y′(λ) is non-positive, y(λ) is non-increasing, and λ(1−√µ
λ
)2 =
1
y(λ)2 is non-decreasing. Hence
1
(1−√µ
1
)2 ≤ λ(1−√µ
λ
)2 for all λ ≥ 1. 
A.2 Lower bounds
Theorem A.3 ([31]). Let G be a 2-terminal directed acyclic graph, and let k ≥ 2. e following
conditions coincide:
(1) G is a directed series-parallel graph;
(2) e directed Braess graphGB is not d-embedded inG ;
(3) SPW(G) = 1;
Proposition A.4. Consider any graph such that SPW(G) > 1. For any ϵ > 0 and any M ′ > 0,
there is a symmetric game with biases G = (G, Gˆ) and equilibria f ∗ ∈ EQ(G), fˆ ∗ ∈ EQ(Gˆ), such
that:
• Only a fraction r2 = ϵ of the agents in G are biased;
• For the unbiased type 1, SC1(G, fˆ
∗) ≥ M ′ · SC1(G, f ∗);
• In particular, BPoA(G) > (1 − ϵ)M ′.
Proof. By theorem A.3 it is sufficient to construct a bad example on the Braess graph to prove
the proposition.
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(a) c(x) = cˆ1(x)
a b
s
t
x 0
0 x
M
(b) cˆ2(x)
a b
s
t
0 M
M 0
0
Figure 4. All agents need to select an s − t path. Some fraction of type 2 agents adopt the modified cost
function cˆ2, where M ≫ 1 is some large constant.
Indeed, consider the network in Figure 4, where the valueM is some large number that will be
set later on. Suppose the total mass is one unit, and that all agents need to flow from s to t . In the
gameG, costs are as in Figure 4 (a). us in the equilibrium f ∗, the agents will split evenly among
the paths s −a− t and s −b − t , so that each agent incurs the same cost of (2 · 1/2)M = 1M = 1, and
thus SC1(f ∗,G) = r1 = 1 − ϵ . Now, denote the unbiased agents as type 1, and suppose that some
fraction r2 = ϵ > 0 of agents is of a type 2, with biased costs cˆ
2. See Figure 4 (b).
In the equilibrium fˆ
∗
, all type 2 agents will select the path s−a−b−t , whereas all type 1 agents
will split evenly. us there will be fˆ ∗e =
1
2 +
ϵ
2 > f
∗
e agents on each edge s − a and b − t .
We now compute the cost for the type 1 agents in fˆ
∗
. SetM > M
′
ϵ
. For every such agent taking
the path p = (s − a − t), the cost is
c(p, fˆ ∗) = cua( fˆ ∗ua) = cua(2(
1
2
+
ϵ
2
))M = (1 + ϵ)M > M ′.
us the total cost for type 1 agents is SC1(G, fˆ
∗) > (1 − ϵ)M ′ = M ′SC1(G, f ∗).
Finally, since f ∗ is a valid flow in G,
BPoA(G) ≥ SC( fˆ
∗
,G)
SC(f ∗,G) ≥
SC1( fˆ
∗
,G)
SC(f ∗,G) >
(1 − ϵ)M ′
1
= (1 − ϵ)M ′,
as required. 
Proposition 5.4. Let any k ≥, any q > 2, and any ri < 12 . ere is a symmetric game with biases
G = 〈G, Gˆ〉, and a flow fˆ ∗ s.t.:
(1) SPW(G) = k ;
(2) in Gˆ there are ri agents of type i , and
∑
j≤m r j = 1;
(3) 〈G, Gˆi 〉 is (λˆi , µˆi )-biased smooth, where λˆi
1−µˆ i = q;
(4) fˆ
∗
is the unique equilibrium of Gˆ;
(5) SCi (G, fˆ
∗) ≥ Ω(1) rirk λˆ
i
1−µˆ iOPT (Gi, (k)) = Ω(1)
ri
r
λˆi
1−µˆ i kOPT (G).
Proof. Consider the k-Cross-Parallel graph GCP (k) (see Fig. 2), with one additional edge est .
We define the real costs as follows: csa = cbt = cba ≡ 0, cst ≡ q2 , cab (x) = x . ere is a mass of
r = 1 agents, and all paths from s to t are allowed (the game is symmetric). In the equilibrium flow
of Gi, (k) the mass rk = k splits evenly among all k parallel paths (excluding est ), and the cost for
each agent is cab (1) = 1. In particular,OPT (Gi, (k)) = k . Similarly, in the flow ofGwhere all agents
split evenly, OPT (G) = r · cab ( 1k ) = 1k .
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We now define the modified costs. For type i , cˆi
ab
(x) = qx , whereas all other costs remain
unchanged. For all other agents (denote as type j), we set cˆ
j
st = cˆ
j
sa = cˆ
j
bt
≡ 10qk and cˆ j
ab
= cˆ
j
ba
≡ 0.
We argue that (G, Gˆi ) is (q, 0)-biased smooth: We know (see Table 3)) that any affine function c(x)
is ( q24(q−1) , 0)-biased smooth w.r.t. cˆ(x) = c(qx) for any q ≥ 1. Note that
q2
4(q−1) ≤ q for all q > 43 , and
thus λˆ
i
1−µˆ i ≤
q
1−0 = q.
In any equilibrium of Gˆ, all type j agents follow the long path through all vertices (s,b1,a2,b2, . . . ,bk−1,ak , t).
Hence for any path that includes an a−b edge, the cost for i is at least cˆi
ab
(r j ) = q · r j > q2 . us in
the only equilibrium fˆ
∗
, all type i agents will select the direct path est and experience a cost of
q
2 .
Puing everything together,
SCi (G, fˆ
∗) = ri
q
2
=
1
2
ri
rk
qk = Ω(1) ri
rk
λˆi
1 − µˆiOPT (G
i, (k)) = Ω(1)ri
r
λˆi
1 − µˆi kOPT (G),
as required. 
Since we only used affine cost functions, the bounds in both eorem 5.1 and Cor. 5.3(1) are
tight up to a constant. Also, since the graph used in the proof is a minor of GCP (k+1), and thus by
eorem A.3 a minor of any graph with SPW(G) > k , the example in Prop. 5.4 can be constructed
for any graph G with SPW(G) > k .
B STRUCTURE-INDEPENDENT BOUNDS
Proposition 6.2. Consider c, cˆ such that c is (λ, µ)-smooth, ∆(c, cˆ, r ) ≤ 1 + δ , and ∆(cˆ, c, r ) ≤ 1 + δˆ
for some δ , δˆ ≥ 0. en c is
(
(1 + δ )λ, µ+δˆ
1+δˆ
)
-biased-smooth w.r.t. cˆ (in the range [0, r ]).
Proof. Consider some x , x ′ ∈ [0, r ]. If x ′ ≥ x , then
c(x)x + cˆ(x)(x ′ − x) ≤ c(x)x + (1 + δ )c(x)(x ′ − x)
= c(x)x + (1 + δ )c(x)x ′ − c(x)x − δc(x)x = (1 + δ )c(x)x ′ − δc(x)x
≤ (1 + δ )(λc(x ′)x ′ + µc(x)x) − δc(x)x = (1 + δ )λc(x ′)x ′ + (µ + δ (µ − 1))c(x)x
≤ (1 + δ )λc(x ′)x ′ + µc(x)x ≤ (1 + δ )λc(x ′)x ′ + µ + δˆ
1 + δˆ
c(x)x (µ < 1)
If x > x ′, then
c(x)x + cˆ(x)(x ′ − x) = c(x)x − cˆ(x)(x − x ′) ≤ c(x)x − 1
1 + δˆ
c(x)(x − x ′)
= (1 − 1
1 + δˆ
)c(x)x + 1
1 + δˆ
c(x)x ′
=
δˆ
1 + δˆ
c(x)x + 1
1 + δˆ
c(x)x ′ ≤ δˆ
1 + δˆ
c(x)x + 1
1 + δˆ
(λc(x ′)x ′ + µc(x)x)
=
λ
1 + δˆ
c(x ′)x ′ + δˆ + µ
1 + δˆ
c(x)x
≤ λc(x ′)x ′ + µ + δˆ
1 + δˆ
c(x)x ≤ (1 + δ )λc(x ′)x ′ + µ + δˆ
1 + δˆ
c(x)x
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We therefore get that for any x , x ′ ≥ 0, c(x)x + cˆ(x)(x ′ − x) ≤ (1+δ )λc(x ′)x ′ + (µ + δˆ (1− µ))c(x)x ,
meaning that c is
(
(1 + δ )λ, µ + δˆ (1 − µ)
)
-biased smooth w.r.t cˆ . 
Proposition 6.3. Let r > 0. Suppose that c is (λ, µ)-smooth, and (λˆ, µˆ)-biased smooth w.r.t. cˆ . en
∆(c, cˆ, r ) ≤ 11−µˆ ; ∆(cˆ, c, r ) ≤ λ(1−√µ )2 λˆ. Also, for polynomials of degree at most d , ∆(cˆ, c, r ) ≤ (d +1)eλˆ,
where e is the natural logarithm base.
Proof. By definition, ∆(c, cˆ, r ) ≤ supx>0 c(x )cˆ(x ) , which is upper bounded by 11−µˆ due to Lemma 5.2(a).
Similarly, ∆(c, cˆ, r ) ≤ supx>0 cˆ(x )c(x ) ≤ λ(1−√µ )2 λˆ due to Lemma 5.2(b).
Due to biased-smoothness, for all x , x ′ ≥ 0, c(x) + cˆ(x)(x ′ − x) ≤ λˆc(x ′)x ′ + µˆc(x)x . us for
polynomials of degree d ,
cˆ(x)(x ′ − x) ≤ λˆc(x ′)x ′ + (µˆ − 1)c(x)x ⇒
cˆ(x)(x ′ − x) ≤ λˆc(x ′)x ′ ⇒
cˆ(x)ϵx ≤ λˆc((1 + ϵ)x)(1 + ϵ)x ⇒ (For x ′ = (1 + ϵ)x )
cˆ(x)ϵ ≤ λˆ(1 + ϵ)dc(x)(1 + ϵ) ⇒ (c is degree d polynomial)
cˆ(x) ≤ λˆ 1
ϵ
(1 + ϵ)d+1c(x)
≤ λˆ 1
1/(d + 1)
(
1 +
1
d + 1
)d+1
c(x) (For ϵ = 1
d+1 )
≤ (d + 1) · e · λˆc(x),
as required. 
Theorem 6.4. Consider any game with biased costs G = 〈G, Gˆ〉 where cˆi are polynomial functions
for all i . en BPoA(G) ≤ Φ(G)Φ(G)PoA(Gˆ) ≤ (d + 1)(Φ(G)Φ(G))d+1.
Proof. Consider games G and Gˆ, both over the networkG = (V , E). For any flow f , we have
SC(G, f ) =
∑
e ∈E
fece (fe ) =
∑
e ∈E
∑
i≤m
fe,ice (fe ) ≤
∑
e ∈E
∑
i≤m
fe,iΦ(G)cˆie (fe )
= Φ(G)
∑
i≤m
∑
e ∈E
fe,i cˆ
i
e (fe ) = Φ(G)
∑
i≤m
SCi (Gˆ, f ) ≤ Φ(G)SC(Gˆ, f ).
Similarly, SC(Gˆ, f ) ≤ Φ(G)SC(G, f ) for every flow f .
For fˆ
∗ ∈ EQ(Gˆ), fˆ o = fˆ o(G), we have
SC(G, fˆ ∗) ≤ Φ(G)SC(Gˆ, fˆ ∗) ≤ Φ(G)PoA(Gˆ)SC(Gˆ, fˆ o)
≤ Φ(G)PoA(Gˆ)Φ(G)SC(G, fˆ o)
= Φ(G)Φ(G)PoA(Gˆ),
Due to eorem 6.1, BPoA(G)Φ(G)Φ(G)PoA(Gˆ) ≤ (d + 1)Φ(G)Ψ(G)dΦ(G), which is a constant
independent of the networkG .
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Finally,
Ψ(G) = Ψ(Gˆ) = max
i, j≤m
∆(cˆi , cˆ j , r ) = max
i, j≤m
max
e ∈E
sup
x ∈[0,r ]
cˆie (x)
cˆ
j
e (x)
= max
i, j≤m
max
e ∈E
sup
x ∈[0,r ]
cˆie (x)
ce (x)
ce (x)
cˆ
j
e (x)
≤ max
i≤m
max
e ∈E
sup
x ∈[0,r ]
cˆie (x)
ce (x)
max
i≤m
max
e ∈E
sup
x ∈[0,r ]
ce (x)
cˆ
j
e (x)
= max
i≤m
∆(cˆi ,c, r )max
i≤m
∆(c, cˆ j , r ) = Φ(G)Φ(G),
which entails the theorem. 
Corollary 6.5. Consider any game with biased costs G = 〈G, Gˆ〉 where for all i ≤ m and
e ∈ E: (a) ce , cˆie are polynomials of degree at most d ; and (b) ce is (λˆ, µˆ)-biased smooth w.r.t. cˆie . en
BPoA(G) ≤ (d + 1)e λˆ1−µˆ PoA(Gˆ) ≤ (d + 1)d+2ed+1
(
λˆ
1−µˆ
)d+1
.
Proof. By Prop. 6.3,
Φ(G) = max
i≤m
max
e ∈E
∆(c, cˆi , r ) = max
i≤m
max
e ∈E
sup
x ∈[0,r ]
ce (x)
cˆie (x)
≤ max
i≤m
1
1 − µˆi ≤
1
1 − µˆ ;
Φ(G) = max
i≤m
max
e ∈E
∆(cˆi , c, r ) = max
i≤m
max
e ∈E
sup
x ∈[0,r ]
cˆie (x)
ce (x)
≤ max
i≤m
((d + 1) · e · λˆi ) = (d + 1) · e · λˆ.
By combining the above bounds with eorem 6.4, the proof is complete. 
C SPECIFIC BIASES
e examples of pessimism, risk aversion, and small error reflect cognitive biases that cause agents
to optimize the “wrong cost.” In the examples of toll-sensitivity and altruism, the agents may be
aware of their own cost functions, but these are still different from the one that the analyst cares
about.
C.1 Uncertainty and Risk Aversion
Following Nikolova and Stier-Moses [34, 35], we consider an arbitrary cost function c(x) and an
arbitrary distribution ϵ(x) with mean 0 and bounded variance var(ϵ(x)) ≤ τc(x) for all x > 0.
Denote vϵ (x) = var(ϵ (x ))c(x ) ∈ [0, τ ], and suppose that c(x) is (1, µ)-smooth for some µ < 1. For an
agent with risk aversion γ , define the biased cost as
cˆγ ,ϵ (x) = c(x) + γvϵ (x)c(x), (Risk-averse cost)
(meaning the agent prefers paths that are longer in expectation, but with lower variance).
Nikolova and Stier-Moses bounded the Price of Risk Aversion (PRA), which is the ratio between
the social welfare in the biased equilibrium and that in the non-biased equilibrium. ey focus on
a structural parameter η of the underlying network (may be as large as |V |/2 in the general case).
Denote by G(η, µ) all games where the network parameter is at most η, and every cost function is
(1, µ)-smooth. We omit parameters if they do not impose any constraints.
e main result in [35] is that the PRA is upper bounded by 1 + τγη. In particular this leads to
a bound of BPoA(G, Gˆγ ) ≤ 1+γ τη1−µ for any game G ∈ G(η, µ), under uniform risk aversion γ and a
bound vϵ (x) ≤ τ .
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Figure 5. Fig. 5a illustrates a game G that is a quadratic variation of the Braess paradox [22]. The other
subfigures present three biased versions of G. For example, the game Gˆb is played by pessimistic agents,
with parameter α = 3. Hence the edges with fixed costs do not change, but the biased cost on the edge a −b
for example is cˆs−a(x) = cs−a(3x) = (3x)2 = 9x2.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
x = fs−a = fb−t
So
ci
al
C
o
st
S
C
(f
)
x∗a = 1
x∗
b
=
1
3
x∗c =
1√
3
x∗
d
=
√
17−1
4
Figure 6. The social cost in game G from Fig. 5 as a function of the traffic on the edge s − a (assuming
symmetric flow). The equilibria of all four games are presented.
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We show that c is (1 + γτ , µ)-biased-smooth w.r.t. cˆγ ,ϵ , which entails a BPoA bound of 1+γ τ1−µ .
Proposition C.1. Let c be any function that is (1, µ)-smooth, and ϵ(x) such that vϵ (x) ≤ τ . For
γ ≥ 0, c(x) is (1 + γτ , µ)-biased-smooth w.r.t. cˆγ ,ϵ (x).
Proof. Suppose first that x ′ ≤ x . en
xc(c) + cˆγ ,ϵ (x)(x ′ − x) = xc(x) + (c(x) + γvϵ (x)c(x))(x ′ − x) ≤ c(x)x + c(x)(x ′ − x)
= c(x)x ′ ≤ c(x ′)x ′ + µc(x)x ≤ (1 + γτ )c(x ′)x ′ + µc(x)x .
(from smoothness of c)
Next, suppose that x ′ > x . en
xc(c) + cˆγ ,ϵ (x)(x ′ − x) = xc(x) + (c(x) + γvϵ (x)c(x))(x ′ − x) ≤ xc(x) + (c(x) + γτc(x))(x ′ − x)
= xc(x) + (1 + γτ )c(x)(x ′ − x) = −γτxc(x) + (1 + γτ )c(x)x ′
≤ −γτc(x)x + (1 + γτ )(c(x ′)x ′ + µc(x)x)
= (1 + γτ )c(x ′)x ′ + µc(x)x + γτ (µ − 1)c(x)x (Since µ < 1)
≤ (1 + γτ )c(x ′)x ′ + µc(x)x ,
as required. 
Corollary C.2. For any game G ∈ G(µ), any noise ϵ such that vϵ (x) ≤ τ and any risk aversion
parameter γ ,
BPoA(G, Gˆγ ) ≤ 1 + γτ
1 − µ .
us in games with homogeneous risk-aversion we can apply either this structure-independent
bound or the structure-dependent bound from Nikolova and Stier-Moses [35]. Which bound is
beer depends on the exact game.
C.2 Small errors
e biased cost function cˆe can be any function as long as
cˆe (x )
ce (x ) ≤ 1 + δˆ and
ce (x )
cˆe (x ) ≤ 1 + δ for all
x ≤ r .
In such games where the objective gameG is (λ, µ)-smooth, we have a BPoA bound of (1+δ )λ
1− µ+δˆ
1+δˆ
by
Prop. 6.3.
e previous examples of biased games assumed players’ perceptions that are biased or mis-
guided. e next example is a case where the objectives of the players and the analyst/designer
differ.
C.3 Altruism and sensitivity to tolls
Suppose that a central authority imposes an optimal toll of xc ′e (x) on every edge (where c ′e (x) is the
derivative of ce ). If agents treat the monetary toll and the cost due to delay in the same way, then
we get biased cost function cˆe (x) = ce (x) + xc ′e (x) = c˜e (x), with the effect that the incentives are
perfectly aligned with those of the society, and the BPoA is 1 [7]. We emphasize that the designer
in this case is only interested in the cost stemming from congestion, and disregards any monetary
transfers.
However since the basic cost is in terms of delay, and the toll is in terms of money, different
agents may have different money value for time, and hence different toll sensitivity [14, 19, 21, 27].
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is suggests a biased cost function
cˆβ (x) = c(x) + βxc ′(x), (toll-sensitive cost)
(see Fig. 5(c)). As discussed in Yang and Zheng [46] these individual differences may be unobserv-
able, and hence cannot be taken into account by the toll mechanism. Chen et al. [13] used the
same biased cost for values β ∈ [0, 1], but in their paper the motivation was altruism rather than
tolls.
In our case, the designer does not know the value of β (or its distribution), and does not try
to fit the tolls to the present population. Rather, we are interested in the effect of the standard,
marginal-cost toll scheme (i.e., optimal for unbiased agents) on the social cost as β varies.
Denote by G(poly(d)) the class of gameswhose cost functions are polynomials of degree at most
d with non-negative coefficients (thus G(poly(1)) is the class of affine games).
Lemma C.3. For any d > 0, 1
(1+d ) 1d
− 1
(1+d ) d+1d
=
d
(1+d ) d+1d
.
Proof.
1
(1 + d) 1d
− 1
(1 + d) d+1d
=
1
(1 + d) 1d
− 1
(1 + d)(1 + d) 1d
=
1
(1 + d) 1d
(
1 − 1
1 + d
)
=
1
(1 + d) 1d
d
1 + d
=
d
1 + d
1
(1 + d) 1d
=
d
(1 + d) d+1d
.

Proposition C.4 (Independently also proven by Chen et al. [13]). For tax sensitivity β ∈
[0, 1], polynomial cost functions of degreed are
(
1,d
(
1+dβ
1+d
) d+1
d − dβ
)
-biased-smooth w.r.t. cˆβ . Hence
for any game G ∈ G(poly(d)) and β ∈ [0, 1], we have
BPoA (G, β) ≤ 1
1 + dβ − d
(
1+dβ
1+d
) d+1
d
.
is is a tight bound.
Proof. We use the inequality [40]
XdY ≤ d(d + 1)− d+1d Xd+1 + Yd+1. (6)
Let c be a polynomial of degree d∗, and x , x ′ ≥ 0.
c(x)x+cˆβ (x)(x ′ − x) =
d∗∑
d=0
adx
dx + (
d∗∑
d=0
adx
d
+ β
d∗∑
d=0
dadx
d−1x)(x ′ − x)
=
d∗∑
d=0
(adxdx ′ + βdadxdx ′ − βdadxd+1)
=
d∗∑
d=0
(ad (1 + dβ)xdx ′ − βdadxd+1)
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For every d ≤ d∗, seing X = x(dβ + 1)1/d ;Y = x ′ and reorganizing terms,
ad (1 + dβ)xdx ′ = ad (XdY ) ≤ ad (d(d + 1)−
d+1
d Xd+1 + Yd+1)
= ad (d(d + 1)−
d+1
d (dβ + 1) d+1d xd + x ′d+1)
= ad
(
d
(
dβ + 1
d + 1
) d+1
d
xd + x ′d+1
)
.
us summing over all d ≤ d∗,
c(x)x+cˆβ (x)(x ′ − x) =
d∗∑
d=0
(ad (1 + dβ)xdx ′ − βdadxd+1)
≤
d∗∑
d=0
ad
(
d
(
dβ + 1
d + 1
) d+1
d
xd + x ′d+1
)
− βdadxd+1
=
d∗∑
d=0
add
((
dβ + 1
d + 1
) d+1
d
− β
)
xd + x ′d+1
≤
d∗∑
d=0
add
∗
((
d∗β + 1
d∗ + 1
) d∗+1
d∗
− β
)
xd + x ′d+1
= d∗
((
d∗β + 1
d∗ + 1
) d∗+1
d∗
− β
)
d∗∑
d=0
adx
d
+
d∗∑
d=0
x ′d+1
= d∗
((
d∗β + 1
d∗ + 1
) d∗+1
d∗
− β
)
c(x)x + c(x ′)x ′.
For tightness, consider the Pigou example GP ( 11+dβ ,d), i.e., where c1(x) = 1, c2(x) = 11+dβ xd .
e biased cost on edge 2 is cˆ
β
2 (x) = c2(x) + βxc ′2(x) =
1+β
1+dβ x
d+1.
Let f ∗ = f ∗2 be the equilibrium load on edge 2. We argue that f
∗
= 1. Indeed, cˆ
β
2 (f ∗) =
1+β
1+dβ 1
d+1
=
1+β
1+dβ ≤ 1, thus no agent wants to switch to edge 1.
is means SC(f ∗) = 1 − f ∗ + a(f ∗)d+1 = a = 11+dβ .
Now consider the state f ′ = 1((d+1)a)1/d =
(
1+dβ
1+d
)1/d
. We have that
SC(OPT ) ≤ SC(f ′) = 1 − f ′ + a(f ′)d+1 = 1 −
(
1 + dβ
1 + d
) 1
d
+
1
1 + dβ
(
1 + dβ
1 + d
) d+1
d
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SC(f ′)
SC(f ∗) = (1 + dβ)
(
1 −
(
1 + dβ
1 + d
) 1
d
+
1
1 + dβ
(
1 + dβ
1 + d
) d+1
d
)
= 1 + dβ − (1 + dβ)
(
1 + dβ
1 + d
) 1
d
+
(
1 + dβ
1 + d
) d+1
d
= 1 + dβ − (1 + dβ) d+1d
(
1
(1 + d) 1d
− 1
(1 + d) d+1d
)
= 1 + dβ − (1 + dβ) d+1d
(
d
(1 + d) d+1d
)
(By Lemma C.3)
= 1 + dβ − d
( (1 + dβ)
(1 + d)
) d+1
d
erefore,
BPoA(GP , Gˆβ ) ≥
SC(f ∗)
SC(f ′) =
1
1 + dβ − d
( (1+dβ )
(1+d )
) d+1
d
,
as required. 
PropositionC.5. For tax sensitivity β ≥ 1, polynomial cost functions of degreed are ( (1+dβ )d+1
βd (d+1)d+1 , 0)-
biased-smooth w.r.t. cˆβ . Hence for any game G ∈ G(poly(d)) and β ≥ 1, we have BPoA(G, β) ≤
(1+dβ )d+1
βd (d+1)d+1 . is is a tight bound.
Proof. Let c be a polynomial of degree d∗, and x , x ′ ≥ 0. As in the previous proof,
c(x)x+cˆβ (x)(x ′ − x) =
d∗∑
d=0
(ad (1 + dβ)xdx ′ − βdadxd+1)
For every d ≤ d∗, seing X = xβ(d + 1)1/d ;Y = x ′(1+dβ )
d+1 and reorganizing terms,
ad (1 + dβ)xdx ′ =
ad
βd
xdβd (d + 1)x
′(1 + dβ)
d + 1
=
ad
βd
(xβ(d + 1)1/d )d x
′(1 + dβ)
d + 1
=
ad
βd
XdY ,
By using inequality (6),
ad (1 + dβ)xdx ′ ≤
ad
βd
(d(d + 1)− d+1d Xd+1 + Yd+1)
=
ad
βd
(d(d + 1)− d+1d (xβ(d + 1)1/d )d+1 + (x
′(1 + dβ)
d + 1
)d+1)
= adβdx
d+1
+
ad
βd
(x
′(1 + dβ)
d + 1
)d+1)
= adβdx
d+1
+ ad
(1 + dβ)d+1
βd (d + 1)d+1 (x
′)d+1.
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Summing over all d ≤ d∗,
c(x)x+cˆβ (x)(x ′ − x) ≤
d∗∑
d=0
ad
(1 + dβ)d+1
βd (d + 1)d+1 (x
′)d+1
≤
d∗∑
d=0
ad
(1 + d∗β)d∗+1
βd
∗ (d∗ + 1)d∗+1 (x
′)d+1
=
(1 + d∗β)d∗+1
βd
∗ (d∗ + 1)d∗+1
d∗∑
d=0
ad (x ′)d+1 =
(1 + d∗β)d∗+1
βd
∗ (d∗ + 1)d∗+1 c(x
′)x ′.
For tightness, consider the Pigou game GP ( β
d (d+1)d
(1+dβ )d+1 ,d), i.e. a =
βd (d+1)d
(1+dβ )d+1 . Denote γ = (1 + dβ)1/d ,
then a = ( β (d+1)
γ (d+1) )d . In the state f
′ where f ′2 = 1, we have
SC(f ′) = 1 − f ′2 + a · (f ′2 )d = a.
In equilibrium f ∗, we have
a · (1 + βd)(f ∗2 )d = cˆ2(f ∗2 ) = cˆ1(f ∗1 ) = 1,
meaning that
f ∗2 =
1
a1/d (1 + βd)1/d =
γ (d+1)
β(d + 1)
1
(1 + βd)1/d =
γd
β(d + 1) .
Finally,
SC(f ∗) = 1 − f ∗2 + a(f ∗2 )d+1 = 1 −
γd
β(d + 1) + a
γd (d+1)
βd+1(d + 1)d+1
= 1 − γ
d
β(d + 1) + (
β(d + 1)
γ (d+1)
)d γ
d (d+1)
βd+1(d + 1)d+1
= 1 − γ
d
β(d + 1) +
1
β(d + 1) = 1 −
γd − 1
β(d + 1)
= 1 − dβ
β(d + 1) = 1 −
d
d + 1
=
1
d + 1
,
which gives us BPoA(GP , β) ≥ SC (f
∗)
SC (f ′) =
1
a(d+1) =
(1+dβ )d+1
βd (d+1)d (d+1) =
(1+dβ )d+1
βd (d+1)d+1 . 
C.4 Pessimism in the Worst-case Cost Model
Suppose now that agents are pessimistic [32], in the sense that they play according to a congestion
amount that is larger by a factor of α > 1 than the true congestion, that is,
cˆα (x) = c(αx). (Pessimist cost)
For affine cost functions, it holds that
cˆα (x) = αax + b = ax + b + (α − 1)ax = c(x) + (α − 1)c ′(x)x , (7)
and pessimism with factor α ≥ 1 coincides with toll-sensitivity of β = α − 1. As a result, we
can immediately apply the bounds for toll-sensitive agents to pessimistic agents with affine cost
functions, and these bounds strictly improve those in [32].
For higher order polynomial d > 1, the equivalence to toll-sensitivity (Eq. (7)) no longer applies,
and the BPoA is αΘ(d ) (for homogenous bias α ).
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Another result in [32] is regarding agents with heterogeneous pessimism levels. is result
only applies for games with affine costs, and depends on the worst bias in the mix, in the spirit of
eorem 6.5.
D POA IN HETEROGENEOUS GAMES
While our focus in this paper is on biased games, some of our insights can be applied to understand
PoA in heterogeneous games. Specifically, we show that PoA in (heterogeneous) PNRGs can be
arbitrarily high even when all agents have affine costs.
A natural conjecture would be that PoA(G) ≤ ∑i≤m rir λi1−µi , or at least PoA(G) ≤ max i ≤ m λi1−µi .
However, the following simple example shows that this is not the case, even for a simple variation
of the Pigou game.
Proposition D.1. For any M , there is a PNRG with affine costs G with two parallel links, s.t.
Ψ(G) ≤ M2 and PoA(G) ≥ Ω(M).
Proof. Suppose we have r1 =
1
2M agents of type 1, with c
1
a (x) ≡ 1, c1b (x) = x . e other
r2 = 1 − 12M agents have c2a(x) ≡ 1M2 , and c2b (x) = xM2 . us in the unique equilibrium f
∗ (in fact,
the dominant strategy equilibrium), all agents use edge b, and
SC(f ∗) = r1 · c1b (1) + r2 · c2b (1) > r1 =
1
2M
.
On the other hand, consider the flow f ′, where type 1 agents use edge b, and all type 2 agents
use edge a. We have
SC(f ′) = r1 · c1b (r1) + r2 ·
1
M2
<
1
(2M)2 +
1
M2
<
2
M2
,
thus PoA(G) ≥ SC (f
∗)
SC (f ′) >
1/2M
2/M2 =
1
4M , as required. 
Note that in the above example, the cost for most agents did not increase, whereas the cost of a
small fraction of the agents increased by a large factor, which also affected the PoA. We can think
about other ways to aggregate the costs of different types, that are less sensitive to such differences.
Our next example shows that the equilibrium cost may increase for all types simultaneously.
Proposition D.2. For any M , there is a PNRG with affine costs G such that: Ψ(G) ≤ M + 2; and
for all agent types, SCi (f ∗) ≥ M ·SCi (f o), where f ∗, f o are the unique equilibrium flow and optimal
flow of G, respectively. In particular, PoA(G) ≥ M .
Proof. Consider a graph that is an undirected cycle withm = M + 1 vertices (such a graph can
be implemented by a directed graph as well). For each i ≤ m, we have si = i and ti = (i + 1)modm .
Denote ei = (si , ti ). For type i agents, the cost function is cie i (x) = 1 + x and cie (x) = 1 for all other
edges. Suppose ri = 1 for all i .
In the optimal flow f o , all type i agents use edge ei , and thus SC(f o,G) = ∑i≤m ricie i (1) =
(1 + 1m )
∑
i≤m ri = m + 1. Now consider flow f
∗, where agent of each type i travel the long path
from si to ti using m − 1 edges. f ∗ is an equilibrium, since the cost for each agent of type i is
m − 1, whereas the cost on the alternative short path is ci
e i
(m − 1) = m. us the social cost is
SC(f ∗,G) = ∑i≤m ri (m − 1) =m(m − 1), meaning that PoA(G) ≥ m − 1. 
Interestingly, the directed version of the graph G in the example has SPW(G) = m, and we see
no obvious way of using a simpler graph. We conjecture that there is bound on the aggregated
social cost similar to that in our main theorem, i.e., that depends on the “average” smoothness
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2016.
1:32 Reshef Meir and David Parkes
bounds and on the serial-parallel width of the underlying graph. If true, this would mean that
while a large group may have a significant negative externality on a small group of agents from a
different type, the opposite is not possible.
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